



Adding happy people 
Theron Pummer 
Almost every week there’s a headline about our planet’s population explosion. For instance 
Indian officials confirmed recently
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 that India is projected to overtake China in just over a 
decade to become the most populous country on Earth. Many are worried that the planet is 
becoming increasingly overpopulated. Whether it is overpopulated, underpopulated, or 
appropriately populated is a challenging ethical question. 
Let’s suppose a ‘happy life’ is one that would be on balance well worth living from the point 
of view of the person living it. Is it good to add people with happy lives to the world? This 
question divides into two more specific ones. First, is it good to add happy people, in virtue of 
the good effects of doing so for us already existing people? Second, is it good to add happy 
people, independently of any effects on the already existing? The latter question is by far the 
more intriguing. 
The Canadian philosopher Jan Narveson famously answered this question in the negative, 
saying: ‘We are in favour of making people happy, but neutral about making happy people.’2 
Whether this stance is correct has a wide range of practical implications for procreation, resource 
conservation, climate change, and existential risks (such as the danger of a large asteroid 
colliding with the planet). Some of the implications are profound: since there are very many 





happy future people who could exist, if morality were in favour of making happy people we’d 
have an overwhelmingly strong reason to pursue the colonization of other planets by our 
descendants; we’d have very little, if any, reason to do this if Narveson were right. 
But I think Narveson is wrong. In addition to being about making people happy, morality is 
about making happy people. By adding happy people we in one way make the world a better 
place and we have significant reason to do so. This significant reason would entail that we 
should add happy people, if there were absolutely no downside to doing so. Of course, it may be 
that adding many happy people to the current population of Earth would have serious 
environmental and social downsides, and be a bad thing all things considered. 
Instead, suppose I could push a button that would create billions of happy people living on 
several large and lush Eden-like planets. These people would in turn produce further generations 
of happy people, who would do likewise, and so on for the foreseeable future. Pushing the button 
would cost me nothing and do no harm or wrong. Would it be wrong of me not to push the 
button, in this case? Yes, I believe it would. 
There are several arguments that philosophers have offered in favour of adding happy 
people. I’ll sketch just two. 
The most fascinating argument is based on a kind of scepticism about the moral significance 
of the boundaries between persons, according to which persons are, at most, mere containers of 
what really matters: happiness. On this view, it doesn’t matter in and of itself where a fixed 
amount of happiness is placed. Whether we put it in this or that container, or build a new 
container to put it in, is in itself irrelevant. Thus, on this view, making people happy and making 
happy people are equally morally important, other things being equal. 
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There are different routes to such scepticism about the moral significance of the boundaries 
between persons. One is purely metaphysical: there simply are no separate persons; there are 
only sets of experiences. There’s a set of experiences here where this chapter is being written, 
and another set over there, and there, where it’s being read. But there are no entities above and 
beyond these experiences, who have them. This sort of view is advocated by Buddhists as well as 
the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume. Another route is only ‘metaphysically-
inspired’, and is consistent with the belief that there really are separate persons. The idea here is 
that when we study certain challenging cases within the literature on the metaphysics of persons 
and personal identity,
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 it appears very difficult to maintain the moral significance of these 
notions, either in general or within particular parts of morality. One such case is that of personal 
fission: it is stipulated that a person would survive if she lost either of her cerebral hemispheres, 
but what in fact happens is her two hemispheres come apart and each is successfully transplanted 
into its own ‘fresh’ body. A powerful argument has been made that this reveals that identity is 
not what really matters—the two resulting persons are clearly not identical with each other and it 
seems arbitrary to claim that one of them is identical to the original person.
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But the most fascinating sort of argument in favour of adding happy people isn’t, in my 
estimation, the most compelling one. Suppose we grant that it matters whether some amount of 
happiness is located in the life of an already existing person rather than that of a merely possible 
person. Still, a simple and plausible thought is that adding happiness is good to some extent, 
wherever it’s placed. It seems even harder to resist when viewed in light of the analogous 
thought about suffering: that adding suffering is bad to some extent, wherever it’s placed. Surely 





it would be bad to bring into the world a life of relentless and insufferable pain. Several 
philosophers have attempted to defend the following asymmetry: while it’s bad to add suffering 
by adding miserable people, it’s not good to add happiness by adding happy people. In my view, 
none of these attempts
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 succeeds. 
Largely because I think the asymmetry can’t be defended adequately, I also think the world 
would, in one way, be made better by the addition of happy people to it. I believe we have reason 
to colonize a variety of planets throughout the galaxy, bringing about trillions of happy lives. 
Indeed, I believe we have a lot of reason to pursue this; about as much reason as we’d have to 
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